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Abstract: American military involvement in the Great War is a widely 
discussed aspect of the conflict. The period following the war is often 
considered an example of American isolationist foreign policy. Lesser 
well known are American efforts to provide food relief to starving 
populations in Europe, which began during and continued well after 
the war's conclusion. This paper seeks to locate American relief efforts 
within broader postwar foreign policy. Although President Harding’s 
1920 election victory on a platform of a “return to normalcy” is often 
construed as a rejection of Wilsonian internationalism and a return to 
prewar isolationism, there is no scholarly consensus. The American 
Relief Administration, created by President Woodrow Wilson and led 
by Herbert Hoover, distributed critical aid to starving millions across 
postwar Europe. Beginning during the Wilson administration, and 
continuing while Hoover served concurrently as Harding’s Secretary 
of Commerce, the American Relief Administration not only provided 
relief but also used conditioned aid to advance US foreign policy goals 
in Europe. I argue that American relief efforts illustrate that following 
the Great War, the United States practiced a pragmatic form of 
isolationism that kept the nation engaged in international affairs.  
 
“Let us stop to consider that tranquility at home is more 
precious than peace abroad,” then-presidential candidate Warren 
Harding posited in an address to the Home Market Club of Boston in 
 




May 1920.1 The Great War was over, and President Woodrow Wilson 
had set the United States on a path of increasing international 
involvement: a path which led the United States to become an integral 
member of the League of Nations and part of the postwar order tasked 
with keeping the hard-won peace.  
 Harding’s vision for the future stood in stark contrast to 
Wilson’s. Under a Harding administration, the United States did not 
join the League of Nations, and instead followed a policy of “America 
First.”2 Campaign posters reflected this distinction; in a poster titled 
“Under Which Flag?”, Harding stands proudly below the stars and 
stripes holding a copy of his “America First” platform while his 
Democratic opponent James Cox attempts to raise a flag on which 
“League of Nations” is written.3 Harding’s message was clear — his 
priorities lay in the United States with the American people, not with 
foreign peoples across the sea.  
 Along with his “America First” platform, Harding vowed that 
his administration would bring about a “return to normalcy.”4 The 1920 
                                                             
1 Warren Harding, “Readjustment” (Speech, Home Market Club, Boston, 
May 14, 1920). https://www.loc.gov/item/2016655168/ 
2 Although in 2020 most commonly associated with the Presidency of Donald 
Trump, “America First” has also been used as a non-interventionist slogan by 
President Woodrow Wilson before the United States entered into World War 
I and by the America First Committee before the United States entered into 
World War II 
3 Republican State Executive Committee, Under Which Flag?, 1920, Poster, 
Ohio History Connection, Columbus, 
https://ohiomemory.org/digital/collection/p267401coll32/id/11876 
4 Elks Make Harding a ‘Surprise’ Visit,” The New York Times, July 21, 1920. 
https://search-proquest-
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election, considered by contemporary observers and historians alike to 
be a referendum on President Wilson’s internationalism and his League 
of Nations, made the wishes of the American people clear.5 Warren 
Harding was elected twenty-ninth president of the United States with a 
popular vote margin of over twenty-five percentage points and an 
electoral college landslide of 404-127. Frontpage coverage in the Los 
Angeles Times described Harding’s inauguration as “the knell of 
American espousal of…internationalism.”6 
And yet, despite a Harding presidency ostensibly marking the 
end of engagement overseas, there is widespread contemporaneous 
reporting of large-scale American relief efforts in Europe which cost 
millions in US government money appropriated by Congress and was 
signed off on by President Harding. This inconsistency begs the 
                                                             
com.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/docview/98182605/588FA3B5136B40EBPQ/2?
accountid=10362; Arthur Sears Henning, “Thousands Acclaim Harding 
President,” The Los Angeles Times, March 5, 1921. 
http://ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/docview/160872122?accountid=10362.; 
Bernard Fensterwald Jr., “The anatomy of American “isolationism and 
expansionism,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 2, no. 2 (June 1958):111, 
https://www-jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/stable/172971; Selig Adler, 
“Isolationism Since 1914,” The American Scholar  21, no. 3 (June 1952):335, 
www.jstor.org/stable/41206917. 
5 Bernard Fensterwald Jr., “The anatomy of American “isolationism and 
expansionism,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 2, no. 2 (June 1958):111, 
https://www-jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/stable/172971 
6 Arthur Sears Henning, “Thousands Acclaim Harding President,” The Los 








question: how does foreign aid fit into the often-held view of an 
isolationist USA?  
 The origins of the term “isolationism” are unclear, but the idea 
of an American postwar retreat into isolation has been thoroughly 
picked apart by historians who have failed to come to a consensus on 
what exactly constitutes an isolationist foreign policy.7 Broadly, there 
appear to be two camps – those who agree that isolationism existed as 
a foreign policy, and those who contend interwar American foreign 
policy cannot be classified as isolationism or reject the term as 
unusable.     
 Political scientist Ronald Rubin’s description of 1920s and 
1930s isolationism provides a concise definition that effectively 
describes the first camp: isolationism is “not…the complete withdrawal 
from world affairs but…refusal to make any political commitments 
infringing on the nation’s freedom of action.”8 Even among scholars 
who contend that the United States did practice an “isolationist” foreign 
policy postwar, the isolationism practiced is not considered absolute. 
Writing broadly about American isolationism throughout US history, 
Bernard Fensterwald Jr. states that in contrast to the strict isolation 
practiced by Japan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, “our 
                                                             
7 What is clear is that by the end of the Great War, the idea of American 
isolationism already existed, with one English journalist lamenting a return to 
isolation in an article published January 27, 1919 
8 Ronald I. Rubin, “The Persistence of American Isolationism,” Pakistan 
Horizons 19, no. 3 (Third Quarter 1966): 241, https://www-jstor-
org.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/stable/41393813 
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policies never amounted to anything more than pseudo-isolationism.”9 
This is not so much a rebuke of isolationism as it is a qualification. 
Isolationism as the idea that the United States retreated completely from 
world affairs and remained strictly within its borders in all matters has 
little if any credence among scholars.  
 Scholars who reject the term “isolationism” in general do so for 
a variety of reasons. Historian David Cameron Watt argues that the term 
has lost its usefulness because it has “been stretched to cover so much 
it has lost all shape or form of its own.”10 He seeks to replace the 
isolationist versus interventionist dichotomy with idealist versus 
realist.11 Watt does acknowledge that idealists and realists could both 
support the same policy for their own reasons, but he fails to 
acknowledge that this could lead to policies that produce results which 
could be described as isolationist. Writing about 1920s and 1930s 
American foreign policy, political scientist Bear Braumoeller asserts 
that foreign policy is defined on three axes: isolationist vs. 
internationalist, unilateralist vs. multilateralist, and neutralist vs. 
aligned. To make sense of isolationism in this context, he provides this 
definition: isolationism is the “voluntary and general abstention by a 
state from security-related activity in an area of the international system 
                                                             
9 Bernard Fensterwald Jr., “The anatomy of American “isolationism and 
expansionism,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 2, no. 2 (June 1958): 111, 
https://www-jstor-org.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/stable/172971 
10 D.C. Watt, “American 'Isolationism' in the 1920s: Is It a Useful Concept?” 
Bulletin new series, no. 6 (June 1963): 6, https://www-jstor-
org.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/stable/27553577 
11 Ibid., 7 
 




in which it is capable of action.”12 He points out that isolation must be 
general so as to avoid mischaracterization of internationalists as 
isolationists if they oppose specific instances of intervention. 
Braumoeller’s absolutist view of isolationism fails to recognize the 
possibility of nuanced or pragmatic isolationism.  
 In this paper, I argue that the isolationism practiced in the 
aftermath of the Great War was not a comprehensive ideology and 
retained pragmatic elements that might otherwise be contradictory. This 
paper will initially delve into a close analysis of the meaning of 
Harding’s “normalcy” and examine Harding’s choice of Herbert 
Hoover as his Secretary of Commerce. Furthermore, I will explore the 
creation of the American Relief Administration, its purpose, and its 
distribution of aid throughout Europe and Soviet Russia.  
 Close examination of Harding’s central vow to “return to 
normalcy” reveals that his meaning behind the statement is unclear. At 
first glance, Harding’s vow to “return to normalcy” seems to indicate a 
return to a pre-war policy of non-intervention. Bernard Fensterwald Jr. 
agrees with this understanding, writing that “as far as international 
affairs were concerned, normalcy meant isolationism.”13 
 The “return to normalcy” associated with President Harding 
also came from the address Harding delivered in May 1920 to the Home 
Market Club in Boston. In it, Harding outlined the country’s present 
                                                             
12 Bear F. Braumoeller, “The Myth of American Isolationism,” Foreign 
Policy Analysis 6, no. 4 (October 2010): 354, https://www-jstor-
org.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/stable/24909828 
13 Bernard Fensterwald Jr., “The anatomy of American “isolationism and 
expansionism,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 2, no. 2 (June 1958):111, 
https://www-jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/stable/172971 
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needs as he saw them and his hopes for the future. The overarching 
message of the speech held that the United States needed to take stock 
of its current position and should return to “normalcy”. The word 
normalcy itself was used in a series of contrasts that provide insight into 
its meaning:  
America's present need is not heroics but healing; not nostrums 
but normalcy; not revolution but restoration; not agitation but 
adjustment; not surgery but serenity; not the dramatic but the 
dispassionate; not experiment but equipoise; not submergence 
in internationality but sustainment in triumphant nationality.14 
In the speech, normalcy was directly contrasted with nostrums, which 
does not imply a turn away from internationalism in itself. However, 
his call for “restoration” and “sustainment in triumphant nationality” 
made it clear that normalcy could be understood to mean a rejection of 
internationalism and a return to an earlier age where the United States 
was not bound to foreign powers and American soldiers were not sent 
across the sea to fight in foreign wars. Nevertheless, despite what this 
speech appears to suggest, the normalcy Harding spoke of is not so 
simply understood.  
 Although his “return to normalcy” address contextually implies 
a return to pre-war policy, his later definition of the term suggests 
otherwise. At the time, the word “normality” was more commonly used, 
so Harding’s use of “normalcy” prompted some newspaper editors to 
change the word before publication. Because of the controversy 
surrounding the usage and meaning of the word, Harding was later 
                                                             
14 Warren Harding, “Readjustment” (Speech, Home Market Club, Boston, 
May 14, 1920). https://www.loc.gov/item/2016655168/ 
 




asked to explain what he had meant by “normalcy”. This was his 
response: 
By ‘normalcy’ I do not mean the old order, but a regular, steady 
order of things. I mean normal procedure, the natural way, 
without excess. I don’t believe the old order can or should come 
back, but we must have normal order, or as I have said, 
‘normalcy’.15 
This definition seems to be at odds with meaning that can be understood 
from his speech. Harding is explicitly saying that his “return to 
normalcy” does not mean a return to pre-war America. This statement 
would be peculiar, if not completely incongruous for anyone whose 
politics were fundamentally isolationist.  
 Harding’s relationship with isolationism is further complicated 
by his choice of Herbert Hoover for Secretary of Commerce. Herbert 
Hoover was not isolationist and supported the entry of the United States 
into the League of Nations. He even lobbied for the League in a meeting 
with President-elect Harding before he had been offered a cabinet 
position. As Secretary of Commerce, Hoover was responsible for 
promoting and developing foreign and domestic commerce as well as 
manufacturing and industry.16 Hoover’s decision to accept the position 
came with conditions. Notably, the Commerce Department would be 
                                                             




16 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the 
Presidency 1920-1933 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 40, 
https://hoover.archives.gov/sites/default/files/research/ebooks/b1v2_full.pdf 
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completely reorganized into a larger and more important department, 
and Hoover would have “a voice on all important economic policies of 
the administration…business, agriculture, labor, finance, and foreign 
affairs,” as they related to national development and reconstruction.17 
During the first years of his tenure as Secretary of Commerce, Hoover’s 
work was primarily domestic with projects including the reduction of 
waste in manufacturing, simplifying the process of constructing a home, 
and improving the health of the nation’s children.18   
 In terms of foreign policy, Hoover’s involvement as Secretary 
of Commerce was rather mundane, managing trade relations with 
foreign nations and verifying the security of foreign loans. More 
interestingly, he was involved in the Washington Conference of 1921-
1922,19 and was an advisor to the Dawes Commission.20 However, 
Hoover’s most significant foreign policy role lay outside of his 
department, and outside of government entirely.  
 Hoover’s final condition to join Harding’s cabinet was that he 
keep his position of Director General of the American Relief 
                                                             
17 Hoover Accepts Place in Cabinet; Keeps Relief Post,” The New York 
Times, February 25, 1921. https://search-proquest-
com.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/docview/98510790/6BAF773E5C2C486FPQ/38
?accountid=10362, Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The 
Cabinet and the Presidency 1920-1933 (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1952), 36, 
https://hoover.archives.gov/sites/default/files/research/ebooks/b1v2_full.pdf 
18 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the 
Presidency 1920-1933 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 61-97, 
https://hoover.archives.gov/sites/default/files/research/ebooks/b1v2_full.pdf 
19 Naval Disarmament Conference  
20 Restructured German War Reparations 
 




Administration. Hoover had been involved with relief efforts in Europe 
since 1914, first as Chairman of the Belgian Relief Commission and 
from 1919 onwards as Director General of the American Relief 
Administration.21  
 Created by an executive order from President Wilson, the 
American Relief Administration’s mission was to distribute food aid to 
the starving peoples of Europe.22 The organization received a 
congressional appropriation of one hundred million dollars to help fund 
its efforts.23 The executive order empowered Director General Hoover 
to choose how and where relief would be distributed.24 At the beginning 
of 1919, an estimated one hundred twenty-five million people were in 
need of aid, in territories stretching from Belgium to the Baltic, Finland 
to Armenia.25 Between 1919 and 1921 the American Relief 
                                                             
21 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: Years of Adventure 
1874-1920 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), 152-154, 
https://hoover.archives.gov/sites/default/files/research/ebooks/b1v1_full.pdf 
; The New York Times Current History: The European War Volume XIX 
(New York: The New York Times Company, 1919), 50-51, 
https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/X_p9AAAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1 
22 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the 
Presidency 1920-1933 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 18, 
https://hoover.archives.gov/sites/default/files/research/ebooks/b1v2_full.pdf 
23 Ibid. 
24 “Hoover Made Head of American Relief,” The New York Times, March 3, 
1919. http://ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/docview/100351880?accountid=10362 
25 Associated Press, “All Relief Work Put Under Hoover,” The New York 
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Administration provided food for millions across eighteen countries, 
saving the lives of at least an estimated fifteen million children.26 
 Somewhat surprisingly, Harding viewed Hoover’s relief work 
very positively. As a senator, Harding voted against the one-hundred-
million-dollar appropriations bill that provided the American Relief 
Administration with the funds required to begin feeding the starving 
peoples of Europe. After Hoover accepted his place in Cabinet, Harding 
commented that Hoover was “performing a big service to the world, 
rivalling in importance a Cabinet position,” and that relief work was 
“America playing her part in the world.”27 These statements seem out of 
step with the message of Harding’s campaign; how can America be 
“first” when the overseas work of a Cabinet member’s private charitable 
organization is of equal importance to their responsibility to the 
American people? 
 When the American Relief Administration was created on 
February 24, 1919, it became a stabilizing force in Europe and stood as 
a bulwark against Bolshevism. In a statement following his 
appointment as Director General of Relief, Hoover stated that aid from 
the United States could “banish the spectre [sic] of Bolshevism,” and 
offered millions “the kernel of democracy.”28  During the last two 
                                                             
26 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the 
Presidency 1920-1933 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 22, 
https://hoover.archives.gov/sites/default/files/research/ebooks/b1v2_full.pdf 
27 Hoover Accepts Place in Cabinet; Keeps Relief Post,” The New York 
Times, February 25, 1921. https://search-proquest-
com.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/docview/98510790/6BAF773E5C2C486FPQ/38
?accountid=10362 
28 Associated Press, “All Relief Work Put Under Hoover,” The New York 
Times, January 4, 1919. https://search-proquest-
 




years of the Wilson administration anti-communism by way of food had 
been stated rather overtly. Hoover described the distribution of food to 
the starving population as “a race against both death and 
Communism.”29 In response to fears that communists would attempt to 
overthrow the nascent Austrian government on May Day 1919, Hoover 
authorized the posting of a proclamation that read, “Any disturbance of 
public order will render food shipments impossible and bring Vienna 
face to face with absolute famine.”30 The uprising Hoover feared never 
materialized as the “fear of starvation held the Austrian people from 
revolution.”31 In March 1919 communists lead by Béla Kun took control 
of Hungary. Allied leaders initially considered using military force to 
dislodge the communists, but Hoover urged restraint and drafted a 
statement intended to rouse anti-Kun forces. The statement released 
July 26, 1919, read in part:  
If food and supplies are to be made available, if the blockade is 
to be removed, if economic reconstruction is to be attempted, if 
peace is to be settled it can only be done with a Government 
which represents the Hungarian people and not with one that 
rests its authority upon terrorism.32  
                                                             
com.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/docview/100527993/E67C4A37C9654E02PQ/2
?accountid=10362 
29 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: Years of Adventure 




32 Ibid., 400 
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Less than a week later, on August 1, 1919, Kun’s government was 
overthrown and Hungary was declared a republic.33 By the time Hoover 
entered Harding’s Cabinet in 1921, he had already begun to be credited 
with stopping the westward spread of Bolshevism into Europe.34 
 The beginning of the Harding administration signaled a shift 
towards a more covert form of anti-Bolshevist aid. It is important to 
understand that by this point the American Relief Administration had 
been restructured into a private charitable organization.35 This move did 
not fundamentally change the organization; the funds and relief supplies 
of the government-led American Relief Administration were turned 
over to the new organization with its mission unchanged.36 However, 
this did lead to a situation where Hoover simultaneously served as the 
chairman of a private relief organization and as President Harding’s 
Secretary of Commerce.37   
                                                             
33 Ibid., 400 
34 “Hoover Accepts Place in Cabinet; Keeps Relief Post,” The New York 
Times, February 25, 1921. https://search-proquest-
com.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/docview/98510790/6BAF773E5C2C486FPQ/38
?accountid=10362 
35 A legal entity titled “The American Relief Administration” was created to 
keep the accounting of the Congressional appropriation separate from other 
payments. When its legal life expired, the decision was made to privatize the 
organization 
36 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the 
Presidency 1920-1933 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 18-19, 
https://hoover.archives.gov/sites/default/files/research/ebooks/b1v2_full.pdf 
37 “Hoover Accepts Place in Cabinet; Keeps Relief Post,” The New York 








Hoover’s concurrent roles resulted in the blurring of private and 
public business. During a series of negotiations between the American 
Relief Administration and the Soviet Russian government, the level of 
Russian government involvement in relief efforts proved to be a point 
of contention. The Soviets insisted that their government participate in 
the distribution of food while the American Relief Administration 
insisted that it have control over food distribution. Despite the private 
and independent nature of the organization, a Cabinet meeting was held 
to discuss developments in the negotiations. The Associated Press 
reported the attitude of the Cabinet as “[insisting] upon the freedom of 
American control of food distribution in Russia.”38 Also, in an 
interesting reversal from his time in the Senate, President Harding 
signed a bill appropriating twenty million dollars to the American 
Relief Administration for Russian relief efforts. 
 If the anti-Bolshevist foreign policy of the Harding 
administration was more understated than it had been during the Wilson 
administration, the question that naturally follows is: why? It may 
reflect a general decline in public support for aid amongst the American 
public. In testimony delivered to the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs in December 1921, Hoover reported that the money collected 
from public charity since August amounted to seven hundred fifty 
                                                             
38 Associated Press, “Hoover Rejects Bolshevist Terms; Harding Backs 
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thousand dollars.39 This may not seem like a small amount of money 
raised for aid; however, a fundraising drive that lasted from December 
1920 to March 1921 raised almost thirty million dollars.40 Hoover 
adeptly summarized attitude of the American public at the time rather 
effectively in his memoirs, “The American people were not too 
enthusiastic over saving people who were starving because of their 
Communist Government.”41  
 In addition to a growing antipathy towards foreign aid, the 
argument that the government should focus on domestic problems first 
before venturing beyond our borders, which we so often see in political 
debates, was alive and well. Although not writing specifically about aid, 
in a letter to the New York Times titled “No Entanglements with Foreign 
Nations,” Idaho Republican National Committeeman John Hart wrote, 
“our government should spend more time in adjusting our agriculture 
and live stock [sic] business and give less time to conditions in foreign 
countries.”42 Even supporters of aid expressed this view. Senator 
Ashurst of Arizona, who supported the twenty-million-dollar 
appropriation for aid to Soviet Russia, believed that although the United 
                                                             
39 Cong. Rec., 67th Cong., 2nd sess., 1921, vol. 62, pt.1: 455. 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1922-pt1-v62/pdf/GPO-
CRECB-1922-pt1-v62-12-1.pdf 
40 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the 
Presidency 1920-1933 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 124, 
https://hoover.archives.gov/sites/default/files/research/ebooks/b1v2_full.pdf 
41 Ibid., 21-22 
42 John W. Hart, letter to the editor, The New York Times, June 3, 1923 
 




States should help relieve suffering in Russia, “the needs of…disabled 
soldiers…claimed first attention.”43  
 A policy of contingent aid began during the Wilson 
administration and continued during the Harding administration. The 
original executive order and corresponding appropriation that created 
the American Relief Administration explicitly excluded enemy nations 
from receiving aid. The executive order stated, “An act for the relief of 
such populations in Europe, and countries contiguous thereto, outside 
of Germany, German-Austria. Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey.”44 
Potential food aid was used as leverage to win concessions from nations 
otherwise unable to receive relief. In a statement in early 1919, Hoover 
asserted that since the desperate need for aid throughout Europe was 
due to German aggression, “the Germans should be called upon to 
provide ships to transport food supplies…and it will certainly be made 
a condition of the allowance of any food supplies to Germany that their 
ships shall be ultimately turned over to carry food for all the liberated 
territories.”45 The conditioning of aid was very clearly shown in 
negotiations between Hoover and the Soviet Russian government.  
                                                             




44 The New York Times Current History: The European War Volume XIX 
(New York: The New York Times Company, 1919), 50-51, 
https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/X_p9AAAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1 
45 Associated Press, “All Relief Work Put Under Hoover,” The New York 
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 Considering that the American Relief Administration was an 
independent charitable organization, most of the conditions presented 
to the Soviet Russian government were not particularly surprising. 
Among the conditions were freedom of movement of American Relief 
Administration representatives, the ability to organize local committees 
without government interference, and assurances that the government 
would not interfere with the liberty of members, to name a few. An 
additional condition is of the most interest: the release of any Americans 
held in Soviet prisons.46 The inclusion of this condition resulted in the 
release of almost one hundred Americans from custody.47 Conditional 
aid made achieving American policy objectives possible.  
 A peculiar coincidence hints that there may have been ties 
between American aid and Soviet New Economic Policy reforms. In 
the December 24, 1921 edition of The New York Times, several back-
to-back articles cover economic reforms in the Ninth All-Russian 
Soviet Congress and President Harding’s signing of a bill that would 
appropriate $20 million to the ARA for use in Russia. The reforms were 
described as foreshadowing the abandonment of socialism and 
consisted in part of “the partial re-establishment of private trade and 
industry,” and the adoption of “commercial principles” by remaining 
state-owned enterprises.48 This is by no means conclusive, but 
                                                             
46 Associated Press, “Russia Must Free Captives to Get Aid,” The New York 
Times, July 21, 1921. http://ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/login?url=https://search-
proquest com.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/docview/98376816?accountid=10362. 
47 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the 
Presidency 1920-1933 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 23, 
https://hoover.archives.gov/sites/default/files/research/ebooks/b1v2_full.pdf 
48 “New Soviet Economic Policy Under Fire,” The New York Times, 
December 24, 1921. https://search-proquest-
 




considering the anti-Bolshevist nature of previous American aid to 
Europe and the conditions imposed on Germany for aid, ties between 
US government aid money and Soviet economic reforms are not 
implausible.49 
 The election of Warren Harding in 1920 signaled a step back in 
American participation in international affairs. However, despite 
rejecting the League of Nations and ostensibly returning to “normalcy,” 
the United States remained engaged in the post-war world. Analysis of 
American postwar relief provides an additional layer of information in 
our understanding of isolationism. Unlike slogans such as “America 
First” or “return to normalcy,” or support or opposition to the League 
of Nations, aid cannot be categorized into such a binary. The varying 
levels of support and implementation of aid allow for the grey area 
required when describing foreign policy. The American Relief 
Administration distributed millions of dollars’ worth of food 
throughout Europe in an effort to save lives and prevent the Bolshevist 
wave from sweeping across Europe, signaling the advent of a pragmatic 
isolationism that saw the United States engage with the international 
community without embracing it.  
                                                             
com.ezproxy.lib.calpoly.edu/docview/98503083/B83A0AC634B64212PQ/18
?accountid=10362 
49 Associated Press, “All Relief Work Put Under Hoover,” The New York 
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